Electronic bidding and in-person bidding- an approach to the limits of public administration competence when rejecting the most advantageous proposal to the administration and becoming an inspector of private profitability: literature review

Abstract

The article explores the limits of the Public Administration's competence in electronic and in-person auctions, particularly regarding the authority to disqualify seemingly advantageous bids based on infeasibility or insignificance. Investigating whether the contracting commission can become an overseer of private profitability, the work discusses the implications of this practice on bidders' autonomy and free competition. The research relies on doctrinal and legislative analyses, using specific laws such as Law No. 14,133/2021, Law No. 10,520/2002, and Law No. 8,666/1993 to address the research question: to what extent can the Public Administration, through the contracting commission, disqualify the most advantageous bid for the public interest on the grounds that it is infeasible or insignificant? The methodology employed in this article is based on a qualitative approach, using a review of specialized literature and analysis of relevant case law and legislation concerning electronic and in-person auctions. The study concludes that the contracting commission should focus on ensuring adherence to administrative principles without encroaching on the realm of private profitability, making decisions that promote equality and cost-effectiveness without compromising the fairness or efficiency of the bidding processes.